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School finance reform litigation has challenged state school financing
systems utilizing both equality and adequacy theories. The litigation can best be
analyzed as proceeding in waves, each with its own characteristics. The first
wave consisted of equality claims based upon the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the second of equality claims based upon state
equal protection clauses, and the third of adequacy claims based upon state
constitutional clauses. Courts facing each wave struggled to address the issue
of whether the judiciary had the legitimacy and competency to address complex
financial and educational questions. The author examines the most recent
struggle and asks whether a new fourth wave of litigation is being created with
claims based upon bdth education and desegregation clauses in state
constitutions, and questions the viability of such a fourth wave.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of institutional reform litigation, 1 school finance reform litigation
in particular has posed difficult questions for federal and state courts alike, and
overall has remained elusive and unpredictable for both litigators and observers.
In school finance reform litigation, claimants challenge the state financing
system for public education as either violating equal protection of the laws as a
result of inter-district disparities in education caused by the system, or as
violating their right to a certain qualitative level of education as a result of
insufficient funding provided to their school district by the system. These two
claims will generally be referred to as equality claims or adequacy claims.
Numerous commentators have noted the transformation of litigation in this area
* I would like to acknowledge Professor Ned Foley for his guidance and helpful
comments. In addition, I wish to thank my parents, family, and friends for their constant
encouragement and support. Finally, I am indebted to all my teachers and professors for their
care and efforts throughout the years.
1 Institutional reform litigation involves the systematic denial of rights, usually of a
plaintiff class, due to the formal organization or ongoing pattern of activity in a governmental
institution. Institutional reform litigation also encompasses prison reform, housing, state
mental hospitals, and school desegregation suits. See Susan Starm, A Normative Theory of
Public Law Remedies, 79 GEo. L.J. 1355, 1360 (1991). For a general discussion of the rise
of institutional reform suits, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 281-316 (1976); Archibald Cox, The New Dimensions of
Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REv. 791, 821-29 (1976); and Owen Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-88 (1978).
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and have analyzed the same by utilizing a theory of waves.2 This Note
examines school finance reform litigation from a national perspective and
within the context of wave analysis. 3
This Note explains, both descriptively and normatively, that a rash of
recent cases makes the continued viability of the third and most recent wave
doubtful. Consequently, this Note goes on to discuss the development of a
fourth wave of school finance litigation. This most recent shift will then be
explained through the lenses of legitimacy4 and competency 5-- two significant
concerns for courts undertaking institutional reform cases. In support of this
proposition, Part II of this Note explains the tumultuous background of school
finance litigation by following the three waves of litigation and recognizing the
reasons and points involved in each shift. Part HII describes the thrust of recent
decisions going against plaintiffs embroiled in the third wave approach to
litigation. Part IV evaluates the third wave, concludes that it is unstable at best
for the future prospects of both claimants and the courts alike, and attempts to
analyze this reversal of plaintiffs' fortune. Finally, Part V posits a fourth wave
and examines whether it is consistent with the judiciary's legitimacy and
competency concerns.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRST THREE WAVES
The history of school finance litigation generally can be traced in a series of
distinct waves, each with "its own identifiable set of characteristics with respect
2 William E. Thro began the idea of waves of litigation in the school finance area with
The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDuc. 219 (1990). For further
discussion of wave theory see William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rv. 597
(1994) [hereinafter Thro, Judicial Analysis]; Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave:
Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARv. 1. ON LFGis.
507, 542 (1991); and Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance
Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 517, 544 (1991).
3 Admittedly, a national perspective across fifty jurisdictions may appear to trivialize the
focused doctrine of each individual state. However, a number of commentators have used this
approach to analyze this important issue. The following analysis, which notes interwoven
approaches, is both substantial and useful in the area of school finance reform litigation.
4 Legitimacy includes concerns of the separation of powers, federalism, and process. See
infra note 106 and accompanying text.
5 Competency concerns include the raw ability to make decisions in the context of the
social issue, to develop and enforce a remedy, and to withstand the political exigencies. See
infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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to legal theory, methods of judicial analysis, and plaintiffs' success rate." 6 The
shifts between one wave and another have occurred for reasons closely tied to
these three unique characteristics of the individual waves. More favorable
political palpability of a certain legal theory, seemingly increased legitimacy
and competency of judicial decisionmaking, and shifts in the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success propel these shifts from one wave to the next. When
courts decide cases affecting large social institutions,
[tiheir success ... depend[s] upon their competence, i.e., upon whether the
problems will yield to the judicial method, and upon their "legitimacy," i.e.,
upon the sense of the political branches, of the rest of the legal profession, and
of enough of the public that what the courts are doing is "legitimate," and
therefore deserves an uncoerced consent 7
Therefore, as courts struggled with defining and limiting their institutional role
in school finance reform, waves of complex institutional litigation resulted.
The following section is an excursion into the first three waves and the
points involved in each wave's respective shifts. It includes an explanation of
how institutional concerns have affected the first two waves, and it foreshadows
the collapse of the most recent waves. Those already familiar with the first
three waves of school finance litigation may move ahead to Part II.C.2 without
losing the impact of this Note.
A. The First Wave: Federal Equal Protection Challenges
The first wave consisted of equality claimss based primarily upon the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 9 This wave lasted from the late 1960s to 1973.10 The foremost
example, and ironically the case which marked the end of the first wave, is the
United States Supreme Court case San Antonio Independent School Distr'ct v.
Rodriguez.11
6Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 2, at 598.
7 Cox, supra note 1, at 822.
8 The first two waves are based on the theory of equality, whereas the third wave
marked a shift from equality to the legal theory of adequacy.
9 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § 3 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
10 See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2, at 600 (listing the first wave of school
finance reform cases).
11411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court held that education was not a fundamental right and
that property wealth did not constitute a suspect classification. See id. at 28, 35. Therefore,
the appropriate standard of review, rational basis, was satisfied because maintaining local
19981 1869
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The plaintiffs in Rodriguez claimed that all children have the right to have
either an equal amount of money spent on their education or equal educational
opportutities. 12 The school finance plan challenged in this case supported
education with local property taxes, consequently creating wide disparities in
funding between property-poor and property-rich districts. 13 On considering the
equal protection claim, the Supreme Court determined that education did not
constitute a fundamental right,14 and that the challenged financing system did
not operate to the "peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class[ification]." 15
Accordingly, the Court applied a mere rational basis standard of review 16
because greater "judicial scrutiny [is] reserved for laws that create suspect
control of school financing was a legitimate reason for the finance scheme. See id. at 41-42,
55. Prior to Rodriguez, successful claims were brought in both federal and state courts. See
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1265-66 (Cal. 1971) [Serrano 11 (finding education to be a
fundamental right and property wealth a suspect classification, and therefore holding that the
distribution of state funds for education could not be based on district wealth); see also Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971) (following Serrano I in
concluding that education was a fundamental right and that property wealth constituted a
suspect classification, and therefore applying strict scrutiny review to invalidate the Minnesota
finance scheme). But see Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-81 (D. Md. 1972)
(upholding the Maryland funding system after deciding that education was not a fundamental
right and that the lack of equal educational opportunities was not a suspect classification);
Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336-37 (N.D. IMI. 1968) (upholding the Illinois
finance scheme because unequal educational expenditures due solely to varied property values
was not invidious discrimination).
12 See Rodiguez, 411 U.S. at 4-6.
13 See id. at 12-13 (explaining that state and local allotments varied from $248 per pupil
in the Edgewood district to $558 per pupil in Alamo Heights, the most affluent school
district).
14 See id. at 30. In finding that education was not a fundamental right the Court looked
solely to the federal Constitution:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name
of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether
education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor, is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies
in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Id. at 33-34.
15 Id. at28.
16 The rational basis standard of review "requires only that the State's system be shown
to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." Id. at 40.
1870 [Vol. 58:1867
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classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights." 17 The Court
was satisfied that state and local control of school finance was a legitimate state
purpose, and it therefore provided a rational basis for the Texas legislature to
finance schools with local property taxes.18
In Rodriguez, questions of the Court's legitimacy and competency in the
school finance context heavily persuaded the majority. These concerns included
federalism concerns 19 and educational policy concerns. 20 These concerns led
the Court to apply mere -rational basis review of the educational funding scheme
and marked the death knell for plaintiffs' federal equal protection claims. The
Supreme Court, having squarely addressed the issue of public educational
finance and the federal Constitution, concluded that education was not a
fundamental right and that property wealth did not constitute a suspect
classification. Thus, the Supreme Court negated future hopes for plaintiffs
seeking federal equal protection relief. Therefore, school finance reform
litigants had to turn to other theories of recovery.
B. The Second Wave: State Equal Protection Challenges
The second wave, primarily covering the years 1973-1989,21 was also
based upon the theory of equality, but because the use of the federal
Constitution and the federal courts was foreclosed, school finance litigation
focused on state equal protection claims brought in state courts. 22 In fact, the
17 See id.
18 See id. at 42-43.
19 See id. at 44. The Court showed great deference to the state legislature because they
were particularly concerned with interfering in the areas of education, fiscal control, and tax
policy. The Court stated, "[It would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate
systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State." Id.
20 See id. at 42. The Court conceded:
In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most persistent and
difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of
specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the
informed judgments made at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps more than
welfare assistance, presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems."
Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,487 (1970)).
21 See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2, at 600-03 (discussing the second wave of
school finance litigation).
22 Second wave claims often were bolstered by the state education clauses that helped the
courts to recognize education as a fundamental right. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d
1998]
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plaintiffs' claims generally arose from identical circumstances of disparity and
were argued in the same manner as the claims in the first wave.
The emergence of the second wave was marked by the New Jersey case
Robinson v. Cahill.23 In Robinson, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
the federal courts' closure on the issue of school finance equal protection
challenges, yet maintained the continued viability of the state constitutional
issue.24 Thus, the court in Robinson applied equal protection analysis.25
However, it failed to find an equal protection violation. In a decision out of
character with the second wave, the court ruled that the New Jersey financing
scheme was unconstitutional based solely on the education clause and not the
equal protection clause.26
359, 373-74 (Conn. 1977) (holding that education is a fundamental right and is codified as
such in the state constitution). State education clauses provide for the creation and
maintenance of the public school system in the state. See infra note 33 for a discussion of state
education clauses.
23 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
24The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
The question whether the equal protection demand of our State Constitution is
offended remains for us to decide. Conceivably a State Constitution could be more
demanding. For one thing, there is absent the principle of federalism which cautions
against too expansive a view of a federal constitutional limitation upon the power and
opportunity of the several States to cope with their own problems in the light of their
own circumstances.
Id. at 282.
25 The Robinson court applied an equal protection analysis quite distinct from the
traditional three-tiered analysis (i.e., rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, or strict
scrutiny) that the Supreme Court utilized in Rodriguez. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that "[ulltimately, a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or the denial against the
apparent public justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary." Id. (emphasis
added).
26 While Robinson marks the beginning of state equal protection challenges, it is odd that
the court's decision for the plaintiffs relied entirely upon the state education clause as is
typical for the third wave, not the second wave. Nonetheless, Robinson is fundamental to the
transformation from the first to the second wave. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education
Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 & n.7 (1991)
(explaining that Robinson and Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash.
1978), represent the only two cases within the temporal period of the second wave to base
decisions solely upon the education clause); cf. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2 at 601-
03 (claiming Robinson as marking the beginning of and as a primary example of the second
wave).
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During the second wave, varied equal protection analysis lead to divergent
results. While plaintiffs in a few states were able to prevail,27 the majority of
the second wave cases resulted in state victories. 28 A number of factors
contributed to the end of the second wave. The multitude of plaintiffs' defeats,
or the ensuing uncertainty of the result, caused school finance reform claimants
to look elsewhere for relief. For the state courts, the remaining concern of
institutional legitimacy, such as the federalism-like issue of local control and the
separation of powers, played a large role in upholding state finance schemes. In
addition, the concern over the courts' institutional competency played a large
part in the downfall of the second wave. By the end of the second wave,
equality as a theory of school finance reform litigation was deemed inadequate
because it lacked the "simplicity and unquestioned normativity that gave it its
initial appeal." 29 Furthermore, the political realities of equality mandates caused
27 Plaintiffs prevailed in the following second wave cases as the state courts moved
beyond the analysis of the Rodriguez court: DuPree v. Alma School District No. 30, 651
S.W.2d 90, 92-93 (Ark. 1983) (holding that local control did not constitute a legitimate state
purpose); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951-52 (Cal. 1976) [Serrano II] (holding that the
discrimination in educational opportunity based upon district wealth constituted a suspect
classification and that education was a fundamental right); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,
373-74 (Conn. 1977) (holding that discrimination in educational opportunities based upon
district wealth constituted a suspect classification and that education was a fundamental right);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that education was a
fundamental right under the state constitution and that the legislature had to develop high
quality educational standards for all school districts); and Washalde County School District
No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334-35 (Wyo. 1980) (holding wealth-based classifications
as suspect). For further discussion see Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2, at 602-03.
28 Plaintiffs in the following second wave cases failed to win in almost identical fashion
as courts applied rational basis review and found that the finance schemes were rationally
related to the legislature's objectives: Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d
1005, 1022-24 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165-68 (Ga.
1982); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 644 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758, 788-90 (Md. 1983); Britt v. North Carolina State
Board of Education, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. App. 1987), aff'd mem., 361 S.E.2d 71
(N.C. 1987); Board of Education of City School District of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d
813, 819 (Ohio 1979); Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d
1135, 1143-47 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-49 (Or. 1976); Danson v.
Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C.
1988); and Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 578-85 (Wis. 1989). For future discussion
see Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2, at 601.
29 Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind. New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48
VAND. L. REv. 101, 145 (1995). Primarily, reasons for the end of the second wave are
couched in the court's questionable legitimacy and competency in determining and mandating
the concept of equality. As Enrich suggests, equality is not a simple concept because there are
four quantities that could be equalized: capacity, actual funding, caliber of services, and
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great strain upon the second wave courts.30
Another fundamental difficulty with equality mandates was that the
mandates are difficult for the courts to tailor narrowly, and therefore, equality
decisions necessarily affect the expanse of other areas of social litigation.31 The
court in Robinson raised this concern when it failed to uphold the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim, reasoning that "the equal protection clause may be
unmanageable if it is called upon to supply categorical answers in the vast area
of human needs, choosing those which must be met and a single basis upon
which the state must act."' 32 Once again, this time because of the collapse of the
second wave, school finance reform plaintiffs needed to look elsewhere for
relief.
outcomes. Therefore, the question arises whether the court is the legitimate institution to
choose from these measures. Conceivably, the legislature, with its ability to hold hearings,
and education experts, with their experience and knowledge, would be more appropriate
institutions to choose the correct measure of educational equality. See Ud at 143-55.
In addition, Enrich stated that "[w]hile the demand for equal treatment by government
has a powerful initial allure, the concrete application of that demand to education has proven
deeply threatening to other powerful societal values." Id. at 155. For example, demanding
equalization of school funds would necessarily bring about (1) restrictions to the capacity,
spending, or services in the wealthier districts, (2) limits on the ability of parents in the
wealthy districts to provide the best educational services for their children, and consequently,
(3) limits on parents' ability to provide the best post-school opportunities for their children. In
addition, a court mandate for strict equality would create the "Robin Hood" effect of the
wealthier districts providing funds for the poorer districts because redistribution necessarily
accrues with any equality mandate. See id. at 155-62.
30 For example, in New Jersey, opposition from the populace, the legislature, and
education experts has caused tremendous backlash for courts' equalization efforts. See Russell
S. Harrison & G. Alan Tarr, School Finance and Inequality in New Jersey, in
CON=MtTONAL PoILMcs IN THE STAins: CON MPORARY CONTROVEIMES AND
HIsrORICAL PATTERNS 178, 181-97 (G. Alan Tarr ed. 1996) (discussing the political aspects
of the school finance reform litigation in the New Jersey line of cases including Robinson);
Douglas S. Reed, The People v. The Court: School Finance Reforn and the New Jersey
Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (1994) (examining the New Jersey
situation with the school finance cases, the subsequent legislative responses, including
disapproval ratings of the public, and concluding that the plan resulting from litigation was not
making the districts equal).
31 See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 283 (N.J. 1973).
32 Id.
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C. The Third Wave: Adequacy Challenges Based on State Education
Clauses
1. A Desciption
With the commencement of the third wave, litigators, courts, and
commentators were confronted with a major shift in the theory of school
finance system challenges. The third wave of school finance cases is based
upon the theory of adequacy rather than equality, demanding that all children
be guaranteed a certain qualitative level of education. The cases constituting this
wave are characterized by claims based solely upon the state education clause.
These claims suggest that school finance systems must provide a certain
minimum level of education for all children in the state as mandated by the
particular state education clause. 33
33 The state education clauses, because there are fifty states, vary widely in language.
Certain commentators have created a typology for simple reference. The most prominent
categorizations are those posited by Professors Grubb and Ratner. See Erica B. Grubb,
Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
RaV. 52, 66-71 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools:
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. Ray. 777, 814-18 (1985).
William Thro modified Gmbb and Ratner's initial categories in propounding his
analytical scheme for third wave cases. See William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the
State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 ED. L. RaP. 19 (1993) [hereinafter
Thro, Role]. For Thro, Category I clauses merely mandate a system of free public schools
without mention of a standard of quality. See id. at 23, 23 n.24. The following is a list of
Category I clauses based on Thro's standards: ALA. CONsr. art. XIV, § 256; ALAsKA
CoNsr. art. VII, § 1; Aarz. CONST. art. XI, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST.
art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MAss. CONST. pt. II ch. 5, § 2; MIcE. CONST. art.
VIII, §§ 1-2; MINN. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art.
IX, § I(A); NEB. CoNSr. art. VII, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.M. CoNsr. art. XII,
§ 1; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 5;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; and VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68.
Thro contends that Category II clauses impose some minimum standard of quality. See
Thro, Role, supra, at 23-24. For example: ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; COLO. CONST. art.
IX, § 2; DEL. CoNsr. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CoNsr. art. IX, § 1;
IDAHO CONSr. art. X, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONSr.
art. XIII, § 1; MONT. CoNsr. art. X, § 1; N.M. CONsT. art. XXI, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2(1); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-2; Omo CoNsr. art. VI, § 3; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3;
PA. CONST. art. II1, § 14; Tax. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art X, § 1; VA. CoNST.
art. VIII, §§ 1, 3; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; and Wyo. CONST.
art. VII, § 1.
Next, Category III clauses go beyond the simple mandate with a "stronger and more
specific educational mandate." Thro, Role, supra, at 24. For example: CAL. CoNsT. art. IX,
§ 5; IND. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; IowA CONsT. art. IX, §§ 2-3; Nay. CoNST. art. XI, § 2;
R.I. CoNsr. art. XII, § 2; and S.D. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1.
1998]
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For example, in the first third wave case, Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc.,34 the Kentucky Supreme Court found that the state education
clause,35 calling for an efficient system of public schools, required the General
Assembly not only to establish a system of common schools, but to establish
one that "provides an equal opportunity to have an adequate education." 36
Based upon the gross inadequacies in the plaintiffs' school districts, the court
declared the finance system to be constitutionally deficient and directed the
legislature to "recreate and redesign" a new system that would comply with
adequacy standards that the court itself rather stringently and explicitly
declared. 37 However, adequacy determinations did not have to be specific. For
Finally, Category IV clauses are those that "make education an important, if not the
most important, duty of the state." Thro, Role, supra, at 24. For example: GA. CoNsT. art.
VIII, § 1, para. 1; I.L. CONST. art. X, § 1; Mn. CONST. art. 8, § 1; and WAsH. CoNsr. art.
IX, § 1.
34 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
35 Ky. CONST. § 183 ("The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide
for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.").
36 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the reasoning behind this
determination is shrouded by a number of difficult-to-grasp terms that haunt courts in this
area. However, the Kentucky court had no problem stringing them together. The slippery
slope is obvious. The court reasoned:
The system of common schools must be adequately funded to achieve its goals. The
system of common schools must be substantially uniform throughout the state. Each
child, every child, in this Commonwealth must be provided with an equal opportunity to
have an adequate education. Equality is the key word here. The children of the poor and
the children of the rich, the children who live in the poor districts and the children who
live in the rich districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an adequate
education.
Id. (emphasis changed).
37 Id. at 212. To date, this has been the strongest state supreme court adequacy
determination. In Rose, in strict opposition to what has been decided recently, the Kentucky
court not only declared inadequacy, it adopted an adequacy standard. This Note will establish
in Parts III and IV that in a recent rash of cases adequacy claims are beginning to fail. The
entire movement of the third wave adequacy claims can be regarded as a diminution of this
first aspirational case.
In effect, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the trial court's list of seven goals or
capacities while also listing its own characteristics of an adequate school system. Also, once
again, it must be noted that the court switches terminology (getting back to the term
"efficiency" as explicitly provided for in the education clause) in introducing this list:
We concur with the trial court that an efficient system of education must have as its goal
to provide each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and
1876 [Vol. 58:1867
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example, in Abbott v. Burke38 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a
sufficient education was one that "will equip all of the students of [the] state to
perform their roles as citizens and competitors in the same society." 39
The Kentucky case, Rose, represents one extreme on the spectrum of third
wave legal theory cases, and has stood as aspirational for adequacy theory
proponents. The Kentucky state education clause does not even mention
adequacy but only "efficiency." Therefore, the Kentucky Supreme Court's
adequacy determination was derived from the mere existence of the clause.40 In
effect, the court held that because education is mandated by the education
rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state
and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate
his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or
vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the court listed the baseline minimum characteristics of an
efficient, common schools system:
(1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Kentucky is
the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
(2) Common schools shall be free to all.
(3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
(4) Common schools should be substantially uniform throughout the state.
(5) Common schools shall provide equal educational oppommities to all Kentucky
children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances.
(6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure that
they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no
political influence.
(7) The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in
Kentucky have a constitutional right to an adequate education.
(8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide each
child in Kentucky an adequate education.
(9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the seven
capacities recited previously.
Id. at 212-13.
38 575 A.2d 359, 410 (N.J. 1990).
39 Id.
40 KY. CONST. § 183.
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clause, a certain qualitative level is mandated, and the court can determine what
qualitative level is required.41
2. The Initial Allure of the Third Wave
The move from equality challenges to adequacy challenges was met by an
often optimistic if not exuberant welcome from a number of school finance
legal commentators. 42 From 1989-1993, plaintiffs, in a number of states, were
successful in challenging school finance schemes.43 The initial allure of the
41 In stark opposition, and as will be discussed in Part IV, the Supreme Court of Illinois
refused to enter the realm of adequacy determinations even though the Illinois education
clause calls for "high quality."
42 See William H. Clime, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U.
lrcH. J.L. REF. 481 (1995) (explaining the third wave's promise for school finance reform
litigation); Enrich, supra note 29, at 184 (declaring that it may be better to leave equality
behind and use adequacy arguments which "provide tools which are more firmly grounded on
the constitutional base, more closely matched to the task at hand, and less threatening in their
reach and power"); Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28
lrcH. J.L. REF. 493 (1995) (explaining the virtue of adequacy claims as necessary in
promulgating vertical equity-that differences in resource allocation should be based on
legitimate differences between individuals in an effort to mitigate innate and environmental
inequalities); Phil Weiser, What's Quality Got to Do with It? Constitutional Theory, Politics,
and Education Reform, 21 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 745, 766--89 (1994-1995)
(arguing that adequacy claims are favorable because they are grounded in the state
constitutions that reflect the people's fundamental public commitment to education). But see
Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMaLE L. REv. 1151, 1172-76 (1995). Heise conceded that
adequacy arguments are less threatening and more firmly rooted in the constitutional base, but
cautioned that:
[alIthough recent court decisions illustrate adequacy's important virtues, fuel
expectations, and suggest its potential, their long term impact on school finance systems
will not be known for some time. Moreover, adequacy court decisions raise important
questions about judicial capacity, the separation of powers and political question
doctrines, and the efficacy of litigation as a device to influence public policies.
See id. at 1176. Professor Heise's concerns are borne out in the cases explained by this Note
as the collapse of the third wave.
43 By 1993, claimants were 7-3-1 in William Thro's estimation. Thro, Judicial Analysis,
supra note 2, at 599 n.6. In chronological order, the victories for the plaintiffs were: Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary
School District No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690-91 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398-99 (Tex. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d
359, 408 (N.J. 1990); Tennessee Small School System v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 154-
57 (Tenn. 1993); Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary
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third wave and its theory of adequacy, beyond the number of plaintiff victories,
was the increased legitimacy that the subsequent court decisions and the greater
political palpability of adequacy over equality that the courts would have.44
Some commentators believed that the third wave's method of judicial
decisionmaking would finally bring coherence to this area of litigation.45
Initially for the courts and commentators, adequacy was favored over
equality because the courts' decisions would be based solely upon the state
education clause. On the surface, this would take care of two of the main
problems of institutional reform litigation that were evident in the first and
second waves: (1) whether the court has institutional legitimacy and
competency, and (2) whether the decision can be narrowly tailored.46
As already noted, these two problems adversely affected the promise of the
first and second waves. For example, the Rodriguez court acquiesced to the
state legislature, citing its refusal to enunciate a fundamental right of education
because of the concern that plaintiffs from all fifty states would take advantage
of a broad statement in attacking every piece of state legislation that created a
disparate impact. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was concerned with its place
as a federal institution in relation to the state and local governments and as a
judicial institution in relation to the legislature. Likewise, in the second wave,
the state courts were hesitant to rely on their state constitutions' equal protection
clauses for fear that the decision would open the door to massive amounts of
of the Executive Office of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516, 553-55 (Mass. 1993). Of the three
"loser" cases, two are post-1993 decisions, which clearly fit within the movement marking
the end of the third wave, and one is a 1991 case following the same line. See infra note 54.
44 See Enrich, supra note 29, at 183-84.
45 See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2, at 617 ("If other states follow the lead of
Massachusetts ... perhaps, some coherence will emerge in this area of the law."). For the
most part, Thro's method of judicial analysis has proven consistent with the litigation.
However, the method allows much room for judicial discretion. In particular, Thro focused
on the language of the state education clauses. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 2, at
600 n.19 (positing a five-step method of judicial analysis for third wave cases where state
education clause interpretation is vital); see also Thro, Role, supra note 33, at 28-31
(explaining how subtle differences in the languages of the education clauses have become
extremely important in the third wave cases). The fact that the education clauses in these cases
must first be interpreted then specified as garnering a particular measure of adequacy leaves
open a great number of questions. The areas most apt to discretion are where incoherence
exists, and where the most recent cases seem to be marking the end of the third wave. See id.
Likewise, Molly McUsic levied a method of analysis for cases based solely upon the
education clauses. See MeUsic, supra note 26, at 308. Her method also focused on the state
education clause language as vital to the courts' decisionmaking process. See id. However,
neither of these accounts considered the court's concerns of legitimacy and competency.
46 See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1298-1313 (recognizing these two limiting elements as
applicable in all institutional reform litigation).
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equal protection litigation from the broad spectrum of social institutions.
Moreover, the second wave courts were faced with separation of powers
concerns and federalism-like local control concerns. Demanding equalization
meant the certain reallocation of finances, and an intrusion upon what have
traditionally been the jobs of the legislature and the local school districts.
However, the third wave, based solely on the education clauses of the
states, was at first thought to alleviate these problems. The education clause was
a direct mandate from the state constitution, and a decision based in its terms
would be legitimized.47 As a result, the institutional concern was avoided
because the state judiciary's recognized function is to interpret the state
constitution.48 Also, because of the direct mandates in the state constitutions,
the courts did not need to make the difficult connection between the challenged
finance system and a broadly drafted equal protection clause. Furthermore, the
courts' third wave decisions were narrowly tailored to the social institution of
education. The education clause was just that-an education clause-and the
courts would not have to worry about the creation of a standard applicable
across the broad spectrum of social institutions.49
In addition, many observers initially believed that relying upon adequacy is
more politically palpable than relying on equality. Many courts and
commentators held that the third wave appealed to accepted norms of adequacy
and fairness. 50 This was important to judges at the state level because they are
elected officials. After all, it seemed much easier for an individual to say that a
child has a right to at least some level of education as compared to saying that
children must receive equal amounts of or equal funding for education. 51
Moreover, at first glance, the concept of adequacy-at least on the surface-
seemed less threatening than the concept of equality.52 Finally, some
commentators believed that because adequacy is necessarily derived from the
state constitution's education clause, it reflects the political will of the people of
the state. 53
47 See Enrich, supra note 29, at 166.
48 For a discussion of judicial interpretivism in institutional reform cases, see Fiss, supra
note 1, at 9-17.
49 See Enrich, supra note 29, at 166-78.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See Weiser, supra note 42, at 754-57 (arguing that the adequacy decisions of the third
wave are legitimized by the will of the people as expressed in the state education clause).
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III. THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD WAVE: A DESCRIPTION
The third wave, as exemplified in the Kentucky Rose case, meant success
for plaintiffs as courts declared finance systems inadequate and posited what an
adequate system would constitute. Despite the exuberant clamoring of third
wave proponents, the third wave does not mark the end of the tumultuous
history of school finance waves. Third wave cases since 1993 indicate a
tendency for the state courts to refuse either of these findings. A number of
state courts have turned away the plaintiffs adequacy claims in the following
ways: acquiescing to the state legislature's efforts, refraining from specifying a
particular level of adequacy, exceedingly finding plaintiffs' allegations
insufficient to support a claim, and refusing to recognize adequate education as
a constitutional right. 54
54 The latter part of the third wave is marked by anti-plaintiff holdings. See Sheff v.
O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1286-90 (Conn. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs' adequacy claim is
insufficient to implicate a constitutional right, but that the disparity between the school
districts as a function of race is unconstitutional); Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch.
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiffs
failed to allege a standard of adequacy which would enable the courts to decide the case so as
not to violate the separation of powers); Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho
State Bd. of Educ., 850 P.2d 724, 736 (Idaho 1993) (rejecting challenge based on
"uniformity" provision of state education clause and remanding "thoroughness" claim while
declaring the state board of education standard the constitutional standard); Committee for
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v.
State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1197 (Kan. 1994) (finding the school finance system constitutional
because the system meets the standards created by the legislature and the state board of
education); School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857
-58 (Me. 1995) (recognizing that no education clause claim was raised by plaintiffs); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 319-20 (Minn. 1993) (holding plaintiffs unable to show that the basic
system is inadequate or that the "general and uniform" language requires full equalization);
Gould v. On:, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (holding disparity does not mean
inadequacy, and therefore that the education clause claim must fail); Reform Educ. Fin.
Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551, 553 (1995) (holding that disparity does not
equal inadequacy); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 122 (Or.
1991) (holding that plaintiffs were unable to show inadequacy of educational opportunities);
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 62-63 (R.I. 1995) (upholding the school finance
system and refusing to declare an adequacy standard); Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Meno,
893 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. 1995) (holding disparity does not equal inadequacy). But see
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz. 1994)
(finding state education provision calling for a "general and uniform" system was violated
where gross disparities of facilities resulted therefrom); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 445
(N.J. 1997) (revisiting the drawn-out school finance battle, this time declaring the legislature's
remedial attempt unconstitutional in its creation of disparity in educational opportunity);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 574-75 (1995) (finding a
sustainable claim under the state education clause); Leandro v. North Carolina, 488 S.E.2d
1998)
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School finance reform cases are taking a new direction at the behest of the
courts. Perhaps, as these cases seem to prove, the optimism of the third wave
commentators was premature, overlooking the eventual questions of judicial
legitimacy and competency which have surfaced in each of the previous waves
of school finance cases. The third wave is not immune from judicial scrutiny.
Problems with the elusive concept of adequacy and the separation of powers
have caused a collapse of the third wave.
A clear example of one response to separation of powers concerns is the
Florida Supreme Court case, Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles.55 In this case, appellants sought a declaration that an
adequate education is a fundamental right under the Florida Constitution, and
that the state had violated students' fundamental right to an adequate education
by failing to allocate adequate resources for a uniform system of free public
schools as provided for in the state constitution. 56 Florida state constitutional
education articles contain both an adequacy and a uniformity provision.57 The
majority held that "[w]hile we stop short of saying 'never,' appellants have
failed to demonstrate in their allegations, or in their arguments on appeal, an
appropriate standard for determining 'adequacy' that would not present a
substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers and responsibilities assigned
to the legislature. "58Likewise, in the Rhode Island case City of Pawtucket v.
249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the right to education provided in the state constitution
was qualitative and encompassed a right to sound basic education); DeRolph v. State, 677
N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (holding 4-3, on adequacy grounds, that the finance system
violates the state constitutional provision mandating the state to provide a "thorough and
efficient" system of public schools); Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384, 397-98 (Vt. 1997)
(holding, in second wave fashion, that the finance system is unconstitutional in that it deprives
children of an equal educational opportunity, but leaving the specific means of achieving
substantial equality to the legislature); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, 907 P.2d
1238, 1264-80 (Wyo. 1995) (maintaining a long line of extremely pro-plaintiff Wyoming
precedent in declaring certain aspects of state funding system violative of state education
clause, and declaring that no separation of powers violation results from determining the
"nature and extent of the constitutional right").
55 680 So. 2d. 400 (Fla. 1996).
56 See id. at 402.
57 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Adequate provision shall be made by law for a unifonn
system of free public schools .... " (emphasis added)).
58 Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 408. In fact, in response to the Chiles decision, an initiative
petition for amendment to the state constitution sought to add a clearer adequacy provision.
See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Requirement for Adequate Public
Education Funding, No. 89962, 1997 WL 719476 (Fla. Nov. 20, 1997) (per curium). The
Florida Supreme Court found the amendment to affect substantially "more than one function
of the government and multiple provisions of the Constitution." Id. at *4. Therefore, the court
struck it from the ballot for failing to comply with the single subject requirement. See id.
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Sundlun, 59 the state supreme court recognized the legislature's authority to
provide for education as a plenary power and as unreviewable in the courts. 60
Thus, the court acquiesced to the legislature in determining the elusive
relationship between funding and outcomes that is so crucial to the construct of
educational finance schemes. 61 Furthermore, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court-based on the record before them, and even though the trial court found
that the level of state fuinding failed to ensure both "substantial equality" and
"adequacy" of resources for children in all communities 62-refused to conclude
that the legislature violated the constitutional mandate63 so as to warrant a
judicial response. 64 In addition, the court recognized the difficulty in quality
mandates, declining to speculate as to the "omens that would presage a
constitutional violation. "65
Similar in conclusion to the Florida and Rhode Island decisions-but
coupled with the uniquely strong demand of the Illinois State Constitution which
calls for "high quality"-the Illinois Supreme Court took the Florida and Rhode
Island courts' holdings in Chiles and Sundlun one step further.66 In Committee
for Educational Rights v. Edgar, the plaintiffs challenged the school finance
system as violative of the very demanding state education provision.67 While
the court considered this challenge to the state constitutional education
provision, it still declared that the question of whether the system offended the
59 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
60 Id. at 57 ("Because the Legislature is endowed with virtually unreviewable discretion
in this area [education], plaintiffs should seek their remedy in that forum rather than in the
courts.").
61 See id. at 62.
62 Id. at 54.
63 "[i]t shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools.... and to
adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education... ." R.I. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1.
64 See Sundun, 662 A.2d at 63.
65 See id. at 57. Also, in this case, the court refused to declare the system "inadequate,"
which would have created a judicial standard in terms of a floor represented by the existing
level provided by the current system. See id.
66 The Illinois education clause is one of only four of the highest demanding Category IV
clauses that make education an important duty of the state-if not the most important duty,
while the Florida education clause is Category II which merely imposes some minimum
quality. The Rhode Island education clause provides for Category II or "a stronger mandate"
of public education. In addition, it is important to note that the Kentucky education clause is
also a Category II clause. See supra note 33.
67 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1180-81 (1l. 1996).
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prescribed requirement of "high quality" 68 was outside of the "sphere of
judicial function." 69
In addition to merely refusing to declare an adequacy standard as
exemplified in the cases above, a second response to a separation of powers
predicament is to adopt a standard already accepted by what the court may
deem a more "legitimate" institution. However, not so coincidentally, the
institution is usually the very defendant in the case. This method is exemplified
in the Kansas case, Unified School District No. 229 v. State,70 and the Idaho
case, Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity (ISEEO) v. Idaho State
Board of Education.71
The Kansas Supreme Court, in determining the Kansas education clause
standard,72 found that the requirement of "suitable" funding most closely
resembled the adequacy requirement found in several other state constitutions. 73
While recognizing the efforts of the courts that addressed the early third wave
cases in Rose v. Council for Better Education,74 Abbott v. Burke,75 and
Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt,76 the court decided not to substitute its
judgment of what is "suitable," but rather, used the standards of the legislature
and the state board of education.77 Not surprisingly, using the base standards
prescribed by the challenged institutions themselves, the court ultimately held
that the school finance plan did not contravene the state constitution's education
provision.78 Therefore, using these already specified adequacy standards, the
68 The Illinois Constitution mandates:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities. The State shall provide for an efficient system of
high quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools
through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as the
General Assembly provides by law. The State has the primary responsibility for
financing the system of public education.
ILL. CoNsr. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added).
69 Committee for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1193.
70 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994).
71 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993).
72 "The legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests
of the state." KAN. CoNsr. art. VI, § 6(b) (emphasis added).
73 See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229, 885 P.2d at 1185.
74 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
75 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
76 Nos. CV-90-883R, CV-91-0117-R, 1993 WL 204083 (Ala. Cir. Ct., Apr. 1, 1993).
77 See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229, 885 P.2d at 1186.
78 See id. at 1187.
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Kansas Supreme Court merely made the appearance of examining the adequacy
question, succumbing to a circularity in which the legislative plan would never
be struck down.
In a similar case, the Idaho Supreme Court faced a challenge to the school
finance system based on the "uniform and thorough" language of the state
constitution's education clause.79 The court held that the "uniformity"
requirement of the state education clause was not violated. 80 However, the
court held that the plaintiffs suit was not foreclosed because the
"thoroughness" requirement had not yet been determined by precedent. 81 The
court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of the
thoroughness issue, holding that the judicial branch has the responsibility to
determine whether the school finance system meets the thoroughness
requirements. 82 Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court noted its institutional
concerns by conditioning its remand, stating that the politically difficult task of
determining thoroughness was simplified because the state board of education
already promulgated educational standards and that these standards were
consistent with the constitutional requirement. 83 Therefore, to win on remand
the plaintiffs would have to prove that the school district failed to achieve the
level of funding necessary to meet the state board of education standards.
Again, just as in the Kansas case, the court here acquiesced to another branch
of the state government-in this case the defendant state board of education. 84
79 "The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the
intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho to establish and
maintain a general, uniform, and thorough system of public, free common schools." IDAO
CONST. art. IX, § 1.
80 See Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportudty v. Idaho St. Bd. of Educ., 850 P.2d 724,
730 (Idaho 1993).
81 See id. at 734-35.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 The dissent in this case was particularly concerned with the court's acquiescence,
stating:
For the reasons which the majority opinion itself describes, I have a great deal of
difficulty allowing other branches of government to set the standard for determining the
meaning of a provision of the Idaho Constitution. However, I have even more difficulty
with the Court's conclusion that the word "thorough" in Article 9, § 1, constitutionalizes
the State Board of Education's regulation requirements for "school facilities,
instructional programs and textbooks, and transportation systems...."
Id. at 741 (Bakes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
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Another reason adequacy claims failed was that, because of the particular
factual circumstances surrounding school finance reform, the primary challenge
arises not from squalid and poor conditions, but from the existence of disparity
between the rich and poor school districts. Therefore, whether a school district
achieves a certain level of adequacy is often not the appropriate question, as
both the courts and plaintiffs have recognized. 85 For example, the New York
Court of Appeals case, Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today
(R.E.F.LT.) v. Cuomo,86 and the Nebraska Supreme Court case, Gould v.
Orr,87 both hold that disparity does not equal inadequacy and that therefore,
without a sufficient allegation of inadequacy, the claim must fail. In the
Nebraska case, the court sustained a demurrer and refused leave to amend the
complaint stating that it appeared "clear that no reasonable possibility exist[ed]
that plaintiff [would], by amendment, be able to state a cause of action."88
Nonetheless, and not surprisingly considering the depth and complexity of
the issue, the collapse of the third wave has not been entirely sweeping. In
marked contrast to the rash of cases failing to support adequacy claims, the
Ohio Supreme Court, in DeRolph v. State,s9 declared the Ohio school finance
system unconstitutional solely on adequacy grounds.90 The court found, in a
close four-to-three decision, that the school finance system violated the state
constitutional education clause that provides for a "thorough and efficient" 91
system of common schools.
However, the Ohio decision and its aftermath actually help illuminate the
institutional issues and problems with court involvement in adequacy decisions.
The issue of judicial involvement in a complex social institution was pushed to
the forefront in the discussion between the majority and the dissent. As the
dissent acknowledged: "Only infrequently are the members of this court
required to balance our appreciation for the principle of separation of powers
among the three branches of government against our desire to use the
85 Due to similar difficulties in matching reality with an adequacy claim, the Maine case,
School Administrative District No. 1 v. Commissioner, Department of Education, 659 A.2d
854 (Me. 1995), took the form of a second wave case: the plaintiffs failed to raise an
education clause claim, and the court rejected their equal protection claim in like manner.
86 631 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. 1995).
87 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993).
88 Id. at 353.
89 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
90 The majority stated: "We recognize that disparities between school districts will
always exist. By our decision today, we are not stating that a new financing system must
provide equal educational opportunities for all. In a Utopian society, this lofty goal would be
realized." Id. at 746.
91 OmIo CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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considerable powers of this court to mandate action to improve the
imperfect."92 The dissent argued that school finance was a non-justiciable
political question that should remain in the hands of the legislature. 93 The
majority, on the other hand, focused upon the poor conditions of the plaintiff
school districts94 and determined that the funding system failed to provide the
adequate level of education demanded by the state education clause. 95
Unlike in the aspirational third wave Kentucky case, the Ohio Supreme
Court refrained from instructing the legislature as to the specifics of a remedial
scheme, 96 but rather sent the issue back to the legislative branch to fix the
system within one year.97 Ohio Republican leaders, who constitute the majority
in the legislature and include the Governor, reacted vehemently against the state
high court's decision to enter the fray. Believing that the Ohio Supreme Court
improperly undertook a legislative function, and desiring to reverse this
institutional imposition, Republican leaders proposed and supported placing any
remedial plan, whether it entail a constitutional amendment or not, on a popular
ballot.98 This, they hoped, would place the ultimate determination of adequacy
in the hands of the people, thereby taking the power away from the court and
legitimizing the process.
92 DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 782 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
93 See id. at 783-87 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
94 See id. at 742-44 (outlining testimony and evidence of severely deprived conditions in
the plaintiff school districts). Justice Douglas's concurrence provides an elaborate laundry list
of the poor conditions evident in the plaintiff school districts. See id. at 757-68 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
95 The majority declared:
We recognize that money alone is not the panacea that will transform Ohio's school
system into a model of excellence. Although a student's success depends upon numerous
factors besides money, we must ensure that there is enough money that students have the
chance to succeed because of the educational opportunity provided, not in spite of it.
Such an opportunity requires, at the very least, that all of Ohio's children attend schools
which are safe and conducive to learning. At the present, Ohio does not provide many of
its students with even the most basic of educational needs.
Id. at 746.
96 The court did declare that "[a] thorough and efficient system of common schools
includes facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain
these facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all local, state, and federal mandates."
Id. at 747.
9 7 See id.
98 See Lee Leonard, School Issue Could Go to State Ballot, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June
7, 1997, at 1B; Lee Leonard, GOP Calls for School-Funding Ballot Issue, CoLuMBus
DisPATCH, June 4, 1997, at IA.
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Despite the turning tide of school finance reform litigation, the recent rash
of cases does not itself constitute the fourth wave because the plaintiffs' primary
legal theory, and the courts' recognition of that theory and method of
decisionmaking, remain consistent with the third wave. Rather, the cases mark
a change in the character of the third wave, as state courts begin to concede that
the concept of adequacy is elusive and succumb to questions of their
institutional legitimacy and competency in the school finance arena.99 Hence,
the finance reform plaintiffs' failure to succeed in the third wave foreshadows
the fourth wave.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD WAVE
The beginning of the third wave carried great promise for court
determinations of adequacy and seemed to appeal to a certain common sense of
justice. In his discussion of the transformation of constitutional adjudication
towards greater involvement in institutional reform, Professor Archibald Cox
declared that "law ... is a human instrument designed to meet human needs;
the only question is how the needs can best be met as nearly as may be, not
only for ourselves but for our children and their children." 100 The third wave
decisions, based on the idea that deprived children should be granted at least
some minimum level of adequate education, appealed to this humanitarian
notion. 101
However, a reversal of fortune has struck school finance reform plaintiffs.
Professor Cox also recognized that the judiciary's function must be exercised so
99 Although this Note argues that adequacy decisions are problematic for state courts, it
does not claim the same is true for federal courts. State constitutions provide explicit
educational mandates directly to the legislature whereas the federal Constitution does not.
This creates separation of power difficulties unique to state courts, and provides greater
judicial incentive to acquiesce to the legislative body. Furthermore, the separation of powers
is explicitly delineated in most state constitutions. Therefore, the unique premises involved in
a constitutional adequacy determination leaves the federal courts with an air of legitimacy not
applicable to the state courts. For example, see Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited:
Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) for a
thorough argument for and detailed explanation of what a federal court adequacy
determination in the area of school finance would constitute.
100 Cox, supra note 1, at 821. The article deals primarily with the federal courts;
however, its applicability to state courts is clear.
101 In an oft-cited piece, that for many marked the beginning of institutional reform
litigation commentary, Abram Chayes was generally supportive of court involvement in what
he called public law litigation. Even so, he recognized the problematic institutional overlap
and stated that his willingness to accept such overlap was simply "actuated by the outcome
oriented motives." See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1313.
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as to preserve it as a consistent, vital, reliable institution of society. 10 2 He noted
that while the courts' own interpretations of their power determines what they
will do in the short run, in the long run, legal professionals (including the
judiciary), political branches, media, and others must determine what they can
do or what is legitimate. 10 3 As evidenced by the anti-plaintiff third wave cases,
and from a national perspective, the short-term promise of the third wave is
settling into the long-term reality.
Institutional reform litigation as a whole, more than any other area of the
law, raises concerns of judicial "activism," and the anti-plaintiff decisions of the
third wave cases indicate that adequacy suits do not satisfy the all-important
questions of judicial legitimacy and competency which are so vital to court
decisions hoping to contravene the "activist" impression. School finance reform
litigation raises the concern about judicial "activism" to an even greater level by
dealing with complex institutions and involving a myriad of issues, including
educational policy and theory, appropriations, and fiscal and local control
issues. 104
102 See Cox, supra note 1, at 821-22. Cox explains:
We may pay too high a price for some short range results that are good in terms of their
substantive public policy if the cost is the destruction-or even the impairment-of the
long-run usefulness of the Court as an instrument for achieving other important
objectives. If destroyed or impaired, the instrument will not be available-or if available,
will not be as effective-for doing the good it can do, without consuming itself, in the
longer future. In quite utilitarian terms, therefore, there may be a tension between short-
run, beneficial social and political results and longer-range institutional considerations-
between today's good and tomorrow's.
Id.
103 See id. at 823.
104 Federal District Judge William Wayne Justice has delineated activism in the
institutional reform area into two distinct categories: jurisprudential activism and remedial
activism. See William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1992). Judges practice jurisprudential activism in the creation of constitutional
meaning when their vision does not coalesce with precedents, majoritarian preference, or
subsequent social or doctrinal developments. See id. Judges exercise remedial activism when
they order broad mandates deemed as an usurpation of the power of the legislature, a
declaration beyond the expertise of the court, or an imposition of the judges' philosophical
and sociological conclusions. See id. at 7.
The third wave school finance reform cases include concerns in both categories of
activism. Conceivably, the adherence of a constitutional standard of adequacy necessarily
touches upon the former, while the involvement in cases directly connected to complex social
institutions of schools and school finance systems touches upon the latter.
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Since 1993, as the late third wave decisions illustrate,105 the state supreme
courts' major concerns are their legitimacy and their competency in dealing
with the legal theory of adequacy. Legitimacy concerns include "(1) adherence
to some charter delimiting however vaguely the proper scope of the judicial
function and the proper manner of performing it, [and] (2) the power to
command compliance, and acceptance, which are forms of consent." 10 6
Legitimacy focuses on the separation of powers, political question, and
federalism concerns. On the other hand, the courts' competency concerns ask
whether the problem will actually yield to the judicial method. 10 7 Hence,
competency deals with the raw ability of the courts to comprehend the problem
and come up with a considerable solution and remedy outside their area of
expertise, the courts' subsequent power to enforce that remedy, and the effect
of political influences.
A. Legitimacy: The Separation of Powers and the Political Question
Doctrine
The separation of powers concern is one of the foremost questions of
legitimacy in institutional reform cases108 because of the legislative and
administrative nature of court mandates reforming a complex social institution.
Under the separation of powers doctrine one branch is not permitted to
encroach on the domain of or exercise the powers of another branch. This
doctrine was found by the federal judiciary to be implicit in the U.S.
Constitution. However, most state constitutions contain an explicit mandate
providing for the separation of powers. For example, the Florida constitution
states that "[t]he powers of the state government shall be divided into
105 See stqra note 54 and Part I.
106 Cox, Supra note 1, at 823.
107 See id.
108 See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YAL L.J. 635 (1982). Professor Fletcher argued that federal court
remedial discretion in institutional reform is presumptively illegitimate and that these
questions are solely for the legislature. By clear analogy, the same holds true for the state
courts. Fletcher explained that the trial court's remedial discretion in institutional reform must
supplant a politically based governmental body, and the competing factors involved are more
complicated and more intangible than those involved in private injunctive suits. Institutional
cases, such as school finance cases, are what Fletcher called "polycentric" in a "non-legal"
fashion. "Polycentric" means that there exists a complex problem with a mmnber of
subsidiary problem centers related to each other such that the solution to one depends on the
others. See id. at 645. "Non-legal" means that the problems are not all based on a protected
legal claim. See id. at 646. Therefore, as in school finance litigation, judges are not bound by
legal norms when choosing one remedy over another.
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legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein."109
Violations of the separation of powers doctrine in school finance cases can
occur both generally and specifically.110 In the general sense, courts are
hesitant to usurp the legislature's power in exercising normal legislative
functions such as appropriations, while in the specific sense, the courts are
hesitant to usurp the legislature's duties as explicitly mandated by the specific
education clause." 1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun,n 2 cited Justice Powell who delineated these two ways that the
separation of powers could be violated: "'One branch may interfere
impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned
function. Alternatively ... [one branch may] assume[ ] a function that more
properly is entrusted to another."'11 3 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the third wave plaintiffs had urged the court to do both by asking the court
to interfere with the constitutional mandate to the legislature in education, and
by asking the court to order equity in funding sufficient to achieve a certain
level of outcomes.114
General separation of powers concerns are not unique to the school finance
institutional reform cases. Any decision that affects a state institution requires
that money be appropriated in some varied manner to cure the constitutional
defect. In the school finance reform context, whether the court determines a
specified level of adequacy or merely declares inadequacy, some appropriations
issue would be raised, even if the court did not specifically mandate a finance
order. 115
109 FLA. CoNSr. art. I, § 3.
110 See, e.g., Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680
So. 2d 400, 407 (Fla. 1996) (acquiescing to the legislature's authority in both the general and
the specific sense).
I See id.
112 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
113 Id. at 58 (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983)).
114 See id. at 62-63.
115 See Chites, 680 So. 2d at 406-07. The Florida Supreme Court explained its concern
3ver its involvement in appropriations decisions:
To decide such an abstract question of "adequate" funding, the courts would necessarily
be required to subjectively evaluate the Legislature's value judgments as to the spending
priorities to be assigned to the state's many needs, education being one among them. In
short, the Court would have to usurp and oversee the appropriations power, either
directly or indirectly, in order to grant the relief sought by Plaintiffs. While Plaintiffs
assert that they do not ask the Court to compel the Legislature to appropriate any specific
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In the specific sense, state education clauses mandate the state legislatures
both to create and maintain a system of public education. Where adequacy
provisions exist,'1 6 that mandate may rise to the level of both determining and
providing for adequacy in the public education system. Therefore, the
constitutions speak directly to the court that educational financing is in the realm
of plenary power of the legislature. The Illinois Supreme Court in Committee
for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 117 stated that, regardless of the state education
clause language, "[c]ourts may not legislate in the field of public education any
more than they may legislate in any other area.""l8
In conjunction with, and closely tied to both the general and specific
separation of powers concerns, lies the concern that adequacy claims raise a
political question outside the scope of the judiciary's jurisdiction. Two of the six
criteria for a political question seem overwhelmingly satisfied: (1) there exists a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department, and (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards exist for resolving it. 119 Therefore, for example, in respect to
sum, but merely to declare that the present funding level is constitutionally inadequate,
what they seek would nevertheless require the Court to pass upon those legislative value
judgments which translate into appropriations decisions. And, if the Court were to
declare present funding levels "inadequate," presumably the Plaintiffs would expect the
Court to evaluate, and either affirm or set aside, future appropriations decisions ....
Id. (quoting the trial court's order).
The court mentions the problem of continuous involvement in institutional reform. If the
court were merely to find the finance system inadequate, and the legislature were to react to
the decision, the court would have to evaluate the reaction. If the court is successfully
persuasive, this tit-for-tat approach, while not direct, nonetheless allows the court to shape
appropriations decisions. However, if not successfully persuasive, the court and the
legislature may enter into an endless imbroglio where the legislature merely refuses to abide
with a non-specific mandate. Therefore, in either case, the costs may outweigh the benefits of
entering the realm of educational financing.
116 Although state constitutions provide for public education in their education
provisions, not all education clauses call for adequacy. See supra note 33.
117 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (11. 1996).
118 Id. at 1190. Not only does the Illinois Supreme Court believe that the education
clause does not give them authority to determine an adequacy standard and therefore impede
on the legislative function, they also believe that dealing with the institution of public
education presents even greater difficulties of competency. See infra Part IV.B.
119 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Consider the others: "[(3)] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; [(4)] the impossibility of an court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; [(5) an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [and (6)] tht
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments oi
[Vol. 58:18671892
TlE TURNING TIDE
determining adequacy, the Florida court held that there was a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards to apply to the question of adequacy as
mandated to the legislature in the state education clause. 120 Thus, the court
refused the complainants because they did not allege an appropriate standard of
adequacy. 121
The early third wave majorities and the later third wave dissents argued
that state courts abrogate their duty and responsibility to ensure that state
constitutional mandates have been met when they refuse inquiry into questions
of adequacy, particularly with the existence of specific mandates. 122 Even if this
were true, the court must take into account the possible damage to the state
court as an institution. Furthermore, the court must consider its ultimate
effectiveness upon the issue of school financing, which leads to the question of
judicial competency. What evolves in the long term, for each of these waves, is
a cost-benefit analysis that weighs public policy and institutional responsibility
against institutional legitimacy and institutional competency. 12 3
B. Competency: Court Adequacy Determinations and the Transparent
Conceit
Closely related to legitimacy is the concept of competency. However,
competency questions ask whether the judicial response is appropriate for the
desired results. Because education is governed by a plethora of complex issues,
the judiciary has been deemed the least capable institution to determine policy
one question." Id. While the first two criteria are more directly satisfied, one certainly can
make a strong case that these are satisfied as well.
120 See Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 408; see also DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 782-95
(Ohio 1997) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). In the DeRolph dissent, Chief Justice Moyer
acknowledged the aspirations of the majority, but levied strong opposition on the grounds that
the issue was non-justiciable because of the fundamental separation of powers doctrine and
limitations upon judicial review including the political question doctrine.
121 See Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 408. Exactly what must this allegation include? Does it
exist? Is it an achievable task for the plaintiff to allege a standard of adequacy? This created
great difficulty for future school finance reform plaintiffs. See infra Part IV.C.
122 See Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 410 (Anstead, J., dissenting) ("While the legislature may
be vested with considerable leeway in canying out this mandate, we cannot determine in a
factual vacuum, without abrogating our own responsibility, that the mandate has been met.").
123 Certain commentators have recognized the complete futility of court involvement in
the normal mode of public law decisionmaking in school finance cases. These commentators
propose a dialogic solution, where the court's role is relegated to that of an arbiter or
discussion leader amongst the political players involved in the quagmire of a school finance
suit. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the
Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 99 (1996).
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within this social institution. The judiciary lacks the ability to hold legislative
hearings and is constrained to a particular set of facts presented at trial. It was
felt that adequacy in education, as a constitutional standard, overcame these
obstacles because the adequacy issue was grounded in an explicit mandate of
the state constitution; hence, the court had the standard it needed to make a
valid determination. 124 However, the recent state supreme court decisions
explain that this is not the case. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court in
Comnittee for Educational Rights v. Edgar125 explained:
The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high
quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of
quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in
any meaningful sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's field of
expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee
might be warranted. 126
124 As explained in Part II.C.2, adequacy was thought to be an easier concept than
equality for the courts to handle competently. However, there are many arguments that this is
not the case and that courts more appropriately enter the realm of equality than adequacy. In
our society, there are education experts who administer, teach, and theorize about what level
of education a child requires. There are no equality experts other than perhaps our courts who
have protected equality through the years. We can assume that the judiciary has a general
understanding of the concept of equality, even though it may be difficult to apply this concept
in the expanse of school finance systems. There are numerous examples in the institutional
litigation area where the courts have properly decided cases based on the concept of equality.
Therefore, the third wave, with its focus on adequacy, does not constitute an opening for the
courts to become the saviors of education.
125 672 N.E.2d 1178 (IlI. 1996).
126 Id. at 1191 (emphasis added). The education clause involved here contains the
strongest "quality" language of all the states-"high quality." ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
Nonetheless, the court refuses to engage in the creation of a constitutional standard based on
the elusive terms quality or adequacy. In support of the decision the court cites to the framers'
discussion:
MR. GARRISON:
It is my understanding that the word "quality" is-in relation to education-is a
much debated concept and that there have been commissions which have given a great
deal of study to it.
MR. FOGAL:
Mhe word "quality" . . .means different things to different people. We had in
mind the highest, the most excellent educational system possible; leave this up to the
determination of the legislature and your local districts, and let the citizens keep pushing
for higher-quality education.
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Therefore, the elusive concept of adequacy has made the welcomed emergence
of the third wave short-lived.
Competency concerns also take into account the role of democracy in our
nation's politics. Although some argue that the will of the people is necessarily
reflected in state constitution education clauses, these clauses give a tremendous
amount of discretion to the courts. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed
concern about this:
To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judicial
determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a
voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.
Judicial determination of the type of education children should receive and how
it can best be provided would depend on the opinions of whatever expert
witnesses the litigants might call to testify and whatever other evidence they
might choose to present... . [N]onexperts-students, parents, employers and
others-also have important views and experiences to contribute which are not
easily reckoned through formal judicial factfinding. In contrast, an open and
robust public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of
representative democracy. Solutions to problems of educational quality should
emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the State and their
elected representatives. 127
Hence, the state supreme courts have begun to find that the judiciary is
ultimately the least effective political body to resolve school finance concerns.
C. Plaintiff' Future Prospects
The later third wave decisions affect the prospects of future claimants in
school finance actions. In general, the cases demand that the plaintiffs meet a
very high standard to sustain a claim. This standard may be impossible to
meet. 128 Moreover, the school finance cases, in general, have shown that the
courts will look to decisions in other states in determining how to ultimately
Committee for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1190-91 (quoting 2 Proceedings 767). Here, Mr.
Fogal explains that the adequacy determination should be left to (1) the legislature-appealing
to separation of powers, (2) the local districts-appealing to decentralization or local control,
and (3) the citizenry-appealing to the democratic strain of competency or politics.
127 Committee for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1191.
128 While the Florida court in Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v.
Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996), did not foreclose the possibility of sustaining an adequacy
claim in the future, it is difficult to imagine exactly what a plaintiff would need to allege.
Arguably, this determination may be similar to the definition propounded for pornography-
"you know it when you see it." Clearly, showing inequality seems an easier route for
plaintiffs.
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decide the issue. Once a number of precedents exist across numerous
jurisdictions, more and more courts will likely begin to similarly reject
adequacy claims. Remember that the early third wave cases, Rose v. Council
for Better Education, Inc.,129 Abbott v. Burke, 130 and Tennessee School System
v. McWherter,131 were followed initially as a number of plaintiffs succeeded. It
follows that the onslaught of these latter third wave cases foreshadows a
number of state triumphs. Additionally, many state education clauses do not
provide a minimum adequacy standard whatsoever, focusing instead on
uniformity or efficiency in education. Therefore, the courts will be even less
likely to strain to find a quality standard.
V. THE FOURTH WAVE OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION
The fourth wave is inherent in the cases that mark the end of the third wave
of school finance litigation as viable for courts and claimants. Looking ahead,
the fourth wave should be applicable regardless of state education clause
language. Furthermore, the fourth wave should examine the school finance
issue in light of other institutional reform cases and properly place it within this
context. Because of the nature of school finance reformers, and most plaintiffs
generally, a move towards a fourth wave is inevitable-undoubtedly towards a
victorious litigation strategy.
As the first three waves of the school finance reform cases exemplify, the
determination of the plaintiffs to find a cure for disparities in education caused
by the state finance systems propels litigation in this area despite numerous
defeats. Furthermore, at the inception of these waves, courts are often easily
persuaded by the niceties of curing the problems of school finance. However,
in the long-term, courts are eventually forced to protect the viability of their
institution as consistent and undaunted. Therefore, with these factors in mind, it
is clear that school finance reform plaintiffs and the courts will continue to
engage in this back-and-forth until a theory arises that satisfies both public
policy and institutional concerns.
The Connecticut case, Sheff v. O'Neill,132 may provide insight into the
fourth wave of school finance litigation. In Sheff, the plaintiffs were able to
succeed despite the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding that the plaintiffs'
third wave claim-that the state failed to provide them with the educational
resources necessary to obtain a minimally adequate education-did not
129 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
130 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
131 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
132 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
1896 [Vol. 58:1867
THE TURNING TIDE
implicate a constitutional right mandated by the state education clause. 133 In this
regard, the court's decision remained consistent with those of the later third
wave cases that rejected plaintiffs' adequacy claims. Furthermore, there was no
true second wave equality claim. Although the plaintiffs claimed that the
finance system failed to provide them with the resources for an adequate
education, they did not include a claim that the finance system violated equal
protection. 134 In fact, both parties stipulated that the state formula for
distributing state aid to local school districts provided the most aid to the
neediest school districts. 135 Hence, the court was not required to determine the
elusive concept of adequacy, nor to determine inequities across a general class
defined by property wealth disparity. Therefore, Sheff stands apart from the
first three waves of school finance reform litigation.
In addition, Sheff stands apart from the first three waves because its
allegations go much deeper. The plaintiffs in Sheff, children residing in the
Hartford public school district,136 alleged that they were "burdened by severe
educational disadvantages arising out of their racial and ethnic isolation and
their socioeconomic deprivation.' 137 The factual circumstance and allegation
necessary for this case to transcend the third wave was that the disparity in
education broke down along racial and ethnic lines, evincing that the districting
provided by the state's public education system furthered socioeconomic
division, and consequently, caused the disparity in education. 138
In Connecticut, minorities constituted 25.7% of the public school
population. 139 In the urban Hartford public school district, 92.4% of the
133 CONN. CONSr. art. VIII, § 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary and
secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by
appropriate legislation.").
134 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1286.
135 See id. at 1286 n.41.
136 The eighteen children were of varied racial make-up, including African-American,
Latino, and white. See id. at 1271.
137 Id. at 1271 n.3. The dissent in Sheff argued that the majority's characterization of the
plaintiffs' claim was unfounded. The dissent contends that the record reflects that the plaintiffs
claimed that they had been "denied their constitutional right to an equal educational
opportunity by virtue of their racial and ethnic concentration, and by the concentration of
poverty in the Hartford school district, coupled with certain disparities in educational
resources and outcomes as compared to the suburban school districts," that the racial and
ethnic concentration in the school districts was violative of the state equal protection
provision, and that they were denied a constitutionally required minimally adequate education.
Id. at 1300 (Borden, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
138 See id. at 1280.
139 See id. at 1272.
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students were members of minority groups. 140 In the twenty-one surrounding
suburban school districts, only seven had a minority student enrollment of over
10%.141 Furthermore, the majority of children in Hartford schools came from
economically disadvantaged households, headed by a single parent, where a
language other than English was spoken. 142 While these differences in
socioeconomic status grew, the performance of Hartford students on
standardized tests fell significantly below that of students from the surrounding
suburbs. 143
The issue was not, however, that the state had intentionally segregated
racial and ethnic minorities in the public school system. 144 In fact, the court
stated that it was economic poverty, not minority status, which indicated the
disparity. 145 Therefore, the plaintiffs claimed, under both the state education
clause and the state desegregation clause, 146 that the state defendants had a
constitutional obligation to remedy the alleged educational inequities in the
Hartford public schools. 147 Although the third wave claims were based solely
on the education clause, the fourth wave claims were bolstered by the addition
of the desegregation clause of the state constitution. The fourth wave cases
added the desegregation clause because the disparities between districts also
broke down along racial lines.
The crucial component of the Sheff decision was the court's decision to
read the education and desegregation clauses conjointly. In so doing, the court
found that the state constitution demonstrated a "deep and abiding constitutional
commitment to a public school system that, in fact and in law, provides
Connecticut schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational
opportunity.' 148 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in its protracted school
finance litigation, previously held that the state constitution, as exhibited in the
education clause, provided a "fundamental right to education and a
corresponding affirmative state obligation to implement and maintain that
14 0 See id.
141 See id. at 1273.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 1274.
145 See id.
146 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
law nor subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her
civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or
physical or mental disability."). See supra note 133 for the state education clause.
14 7 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271.
148 Id. at 1280.
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right."' 149 The second wave finance case Horton v. Meskil1' 50 played a role in
persuading the Connecticut court to read the provisions together. The Horton
court applied strict scrutiny to the finance scheme finding that "in Connecticut,
elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right.... [and] the state
system of financing public elementary and secondary education as it exists and
operates cannot pass the test of 'strict judicial scrutiny' as to its
constitutionality." 151 Therefore, the Sheff court was, in particular, persuaded
that the education clause embodied the "special nature of the affirmative
constitutional right." 152 The Sheff court explained this "special nature" that the
Horton court first expressed:
[Elducational equalization cases are "in significant aspects sui generis" and not
subject to analysis by accepted conventional tests or the application of
mechanical standards. The wealth discrimination found among school districts
differs materially from the usual equal protection case where a fairly defined
indigent class suffers discrimination to its peculiar disadvantage. The
discrimination is relative rather than absolute.153
Hence, the court found that the education clause's explicit requirement
must be acknowledged as fundamental because of the distinct nature of
educational disparity cases. In addition, the court was also persuaded that the
state's obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity was
"informed and amplified" by its unique constitutional provision which explicitly
-by express use of the term "segregation"-directly prohibited segregation. 154
Reading the two provisions together, the court recognized that the question
they addressed in Sheff was distinct from the questions involved in the disparity
cases of the first three waves:
We need not decide, in this case, the extent to which substantial socioeconomic
disparities or disparities in educational resources would themselves be sufficient
to require the state to intervene in order to equalize educational opportunities.
For the purposes of the present litigation, we decide only that the scope of the
constitutional obligation expressly imposed on the state by article eighth, §1, is
149 Id. at 1279.
150 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
151 Id. at 374.
152 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281.
153 Id. (quoting Horton, 376 A.2d at 373).
154 Id. at 1281-82.
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informed by the constitutional prohibition against segregation contained in
article first, § 20.155
The court's complex reasoning and resolute conclusion-that the existence
of the extreme racial and ethnic disparity deprived school children of a
substantially equal educational opportunity as mandated by the state education
clause and as further informed by the desegregation clause-mirrors the
ambition of the other break-out cases that have come to define each particular
wave.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, as judicial protectors of the state
constitution, seemed reassured in its decision despite its interference with a
complex institution-the school system. Perhaps, the majority derived
additional institutional legitimacy from its utilization of two separate provisions
of the state constitution-both directed at protecting distinct rights threatened by
the circumstances of the case. Perhaps also, because of the disparity along the
racial and ethnic divide, the court was comforted that it was able to avoid the
difficult adequacy determination which challenged the court's legitimacy-as
evident in the third wave cases or the troublesome equality determination of the
first and second waves.
In this sense, Sheff may initiate a fourth wave characterized by the inclusion
of the racial and ethnic divide in plaintiffs' claims or the use of two distinct state
constitutional provisions that coalesce to create a more viable cause of action
for the plaintiffs. Even if the characteristics inherent in Sheff encompass what
will be the fourth wave, the legitimacy and competency concerns already
apparent foreshadow its collapse. The Sheff majority itself noted separation of
powers concerns. Although the court required the state to take further remedial
measures, it did not include a remedial determination of its own. Rather, citing
"the constitutional imperative of the separation of powers" the court gave the
legislature and the executive the opportunity to "fashion the remedy that will
most appropriately respond to the constitutional violation ... identified."1 56
Connecticut Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters, author of the Sheff majority,
stated in a law review article published subsequent to Sheff that the question of
judicial legitimacy boils down to "political digestibility.' 1 57 Ironically, Chief
Justice Peters, former President of the Conference of Chief Justices and author
155 Id. at 1281.
156 Id. at 1271.
157 See The Honorable Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm:
Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. Ray. 1543, 1563 (1997) (citing and
quoting HARRY H. WELUNGTON, I mTRPRE G nm CoNsrfmoN: Tim SuPREEm COURT
AND THE PROCESS OF ADiUDICATION 19 (1990) (stating that "law made by judges must in the
end be politically digestible")).
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of the next emerging activist wave of school finance reform cases, questioned
the state judiciary's institutional role balanced against the other branches of state
government 158 and concluded, "[i]f there were easy answers, someone would
have already found them." 159
Furthermore, the hostile dissent argument in Sheff was directly aimed at the
majority's institutional leap. The dissent argued that the majority exercised its
decisionmaking power extremely illegitimately. The dissent conceded the
importance of "finding a way to cross the racial divide," 160 but explained that
the majority:
In its zeal to reach a result that, it envisions, will eliminate racial and ethmic
concentration in the public school districts of this state... . has "[renounced]
this Court's historical commitment to a conception of the judiciary as a source
of impersonal and reasoned judgments.... ." In essence, "[plower not reason,
is the new currency of this Court's [state constitutional] decisionmaldng." 161
In addition, the dissent acknowledged that the legislature was left with the
"extraordinarily difficult or perhaps even impossible" task of remedying de
facto racial and ethnic concentration in the public schools because the majority
158 See id. Chief Justice Peters, vividly expressing the institutional concern, asks:
Is this functional blurring of the lines of executive, legislative, and judicial power a
matter for applause or for concern? Are we moving back toward the parliamentary
practices of colonial Connecticut? Should we do so? Separation of powers is rooted in
very important democratic values. If the judiciary is even indirectly involved in the
drafting of legislation, will it retain its independence to resolve constitutional challenges
to the validity of such legislation? Perhaps more importantly, does such a role risk
undermining the appearance of judicial impartiality and independence? If a judge
embraces the role of a participant in the provision of social services, will the judge
continue vigilantly to protect the individual rights of the litigants and to act
conscientiously on their claims of innocence in the face of their need for therapy? Again,
even more importantly, will the judge risk being perceived as having a personal stake or
psychological investment in the outcome, so as to cause litigants or the general public to
doubt the judge's impartiality? Finally, in a judicial world in which accommodation with
political actors has many visible rewards for the judiciary, do we risk creating a judicial
climate, or risk being perceived as having created a judicial climate, in which the voices
of politically unrepresented minorities do not get a fair hearing?
Id.
159 Id. at 1564.
160 Swff, 678 A.2d at 1296 (Borden, J., dissenting).
16 1 Id. at 1295 (Borden, J., dissenting) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844
(1991) (Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (internal citation omitted)).
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failed to articulate a "principle upon which to structure such a remedy."' 162 As
evident in the previous three waves, articulating principles affecting a large
social institution raises difficult questions of both judicial legitimacy and judicial
competency. Therefore, as already evident in the dissent, legitimacy and
competency concerns may preclude the question of whether or not Sheff
foreshadows a fourth wave.
Furthermore, beyond the courts' institutional and legitimacy concerns,
Sheff has inherent limitations as a wave of school finance litigation. First, the
explicit desegregation clause of the state constitution is unique to Connecticut
and only two other states.1 63 Therefore, other courts would need to implicate
equal protection analysis if faced with a claim that included segregation. As a
result, the plaintiffs' claims may not be very persuasive without the explicit
education and explicit desegregation clause connection. Second, the Sheff
decision, in the same way that it is separate from the other three waves, is
loosely tied to the finance issue. Although the restructuring of the finance
system may be one solution to end educational disparity, it is evident that a
change in the make-up of the districts or where district lines are drawn could
also be remedial outlets.164 This is especially true where the level of resources
favors the disparate district or where it is believed that the problems transcend
money. Third, it is not always the case that the disparities will break down the
racial divide. In fact, a number of the school finance cases are brought by white
rural school districts claiming that white suburban districts attain greater
resources due to property wealth divergence. Therefore, invoking racial
disparity may not be a viable alternative for a number of plaintiffs.
162 Id. at 1295-96.
163 The two other states are Hawaii and New Jersey. See id. at 1281 n.29.
164 The Connecticut legislature's initial response to the decision called for $90 million to
be spent. Furthermore, the education department was given the responsibility of coming up
with a five-year plan that is likely to raise this figure dramatically. In addition, the legislature
approved a very small and limited school choice program. See Rick Green, Mited Reviews
for Legislature's Response to Sheff Decision, HaRTFoanD COURANT, June 5, 1997, at A10.
In addition, despite the rejection of school choice as the ultimate remedial plan in
Connecticut, see Maxine Bernstein & Robert Frahm, Legislative Panel Rejects Proposal on
School Choice, HARTFORD CoURANT, Apr. 25, 1997, at Al, at least one law review
commentator extols the virtues of this long heralded-but rarely applied-school finance
reform proposal as the solution to the particularly complex situation evidenced in Connecticut.
See Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE
L.J. 2375 (1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
After a thorough examination of the waves of school finance reform
litigation, it is clear that school finance reformers have had everything but
smooth sailing. The tumultuous history of challenges to school finance systems
reflect the depth, uncertainty, and complexity of this most expansive area of
institutional reform. The most recent tide of decisions sheds substantial doubt
upon the continued viability of the most recent third wave of school finance
challenges. Yet, despite the collapse of the third wave, the plaintiffs' noble
voyages and the courts' noble quests to cure the disparities in education sustain
continued litigation in this area. In fact, an emerging fourth wave of school
finance litigation may be rolling in as exemplified by Sheff. Nonetheless, the
history of this litigation foretells that, in the long run, even this fourth wave is
likely to dissipate as courts once again become concerned with the preservation
of the judicial institution.

